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1 Introduction
Has regionalization shown its limitations? Recent conflicts in regional unions heading for
deeper integration suggest that the policy content of regional agreements still is a matter
of debate, deserving the attention of theorists in international trade and public economics.
This paper offers a new perspective on the interaction between regional trade inte-
gration and subsidy competition between partner countries. We examine how integration
triggers excessive provision of investment incentives by member governments, and discuss
the desirability of deeper integration in the sense of some coordination on subsidy levels.
The widespread use of investment incentives to influence MNC location is a well docu-
mented fact. In a survey covering 83 countries, UNCTAD (1996) reports that 55 countries
commonly use fiscal and indirect (infrastructure) incentives, while almost all resort to sub-
sidies lowering the cost of capital for foreign investors. Subsidy provision has particularly
increased within regional unions, as a result of competition between rival locations (see a
survey by Oman 2000 providing numerous examples).
This surge in subsidy competition has coincided with waves of FDI flows following the
creation of trade blocs, most notably in the EU, in NAFTA, and in Mercosur. Indeed,
there is considerable evidence that regional integration affects FDI flows, in particular by
redefining the location of horizontal FDI (see Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004 for a
detailed and up-to-date survey and discussion).
Ethier (1998) argues that attraction of FDI, rather than traditional gains from trade,
has been a key motivation for membership in regional unions, consistent with the modest
actual extent of trade concessions agreed upon. If this view is correct, investment incentives
may well have been another way to attract foreign investors, once neighbor countries had
become members.
A prominent example of the coincidence of regional integration, changes in location
patterns and intense subsidy competition is given by Mercosur. Before integration, MNCs
created subsidiaries in Brazil and Argentina in order to ’escape’ from trade protection.
More often than not, those subsidiaries had similar operations, used similar technologies,
and sold similar products (Gatto et al., 1984) on each national market. Regional inte-
gration, taking the form of a Customs Union in 1995, encouraged MNCs to use one of
the member countries as an export platform to serve the region (Kosacoff, 2000). This
coincided with a rise in the provision of investment incentives from all member govern-
ments, most notably in Argentina and Brazil1. Indeed, the implementation of some sort
of coordination on subsidies belongs to the current agenda of talks on Mercosur’s future2.
The above cited evidence suggests that regional integration processes increase MNCs’
”footlooseness” : offering even more favorable conditions logically appears to be in member
governments’ interest. Our contribution is to provide a formal analysis of this phenomenon
in an imperfect competition framework, where subsidies should theoretically improve al-
locative efficiency. We show that, even in this optimistic view of subsidization, subsidy
competition leads to welfare losses, when compared to several forms of policy coordination.
Our model also helps explain the observed rise in incentives provision, seemingly exceeding
pre-competition levels. In addition, we investigate conditions under which realizing the
gains from integration requires regional coordination on investment incentives.
1With, respectively, 22% and 40% of FDI in the manufacturing sector being subject to incentives from
the central State. Some sectors were more specifically targeted by authorities, especially the automobile
and the computer industry, as suggested by the creation of state-funded programmes dedicated to these
industries (Chudnovsky and Lo´pez, 2001 and 2002).
2As reported by Pa´gina 12, Argentinean newspaper, in June 28th, 2005. See also Pol´ınia Rios (2003).
2
We find the following results :
1. The combination of regional integration and subsidy competition leads to an excess
of subsidization, even in an imperfect competition framework where subsidies should
improve allocative efficiency.
2. Conflicts of interest between integrating countries create a potential gain from re-
gional policy coordination.
3. The need for coordination depends on intra-regional trade barriers when subsidies
are granted to an MNC owned by extra-regional residents.
4. Under certain circumstances, harmonizing production subsidies within the region by
outright prohibition is enough to improve welfare compared to subsidy competition.
5. Results (1), (2), (3) and (4) rely upon regional asymmetries, MNC ownership and
profit repatriation rates. Hence policy implications of our analysis need not be the
same regional unions that differ along these dimensions.
Our formal analysis of these issues relies upon a theoretical model of subsidy competi-
tion that is sensitive to the level of regional integration. In section 2, we review the relevant
literature and detail our contribution to it. In section 3, we set up the model and prove
the existence of 4 qualitatively different types of equilibria. In section 4, we determine
the prevailing equilibrium under full integration (4.1), assess the welfare effects of subsidy
competition (4.2) and the corresponding net gains from trade (4.3.1), and investigate the
benefits of regional coordination (4.3.2). Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There has been a great deal of interest in the effects of competition among countries for
MNC activities location. Empirical studies addressing the effect of competition for MNC
location converge in indicating that tax attenuation or production subsidies have had a
clear impact on MNC investment (for a review, see Devereux and Griffith 2002). For
instance, Hines (1996) offers evidence of the structure of U.S. inward FDI being signifi-
cantly affected by tax incentives3. Similar results are obtained by Devereux and Pearson
(1995), Devereux and Griffith (1998) for Europe, and Devereux and Griffith (2003) for
both Europe and the U.S.
Governments may have various motives to offer fiscal or investment incentives to MNCs,
which allows for different theoretical approaches. The tax competition literature, as re-
viewed by Wilson (1999), seeks to explain the effects of intergovernmental competition for
mobile capital on the provision of public goods and overall efficiency. The Basic Tax Com-
petition Model predicts sub-optimally low tax rates and under-provision of public goods4.
The New Economic Geography literature emphasizes the role of agglomeration effects to
explain governments’ willingness to reduce taxes on mobile capital in an integrated region5.
3He finds that percentage differences in the corporate tax rate are associated with differences up to
9-11% in the fraction of foreign investors (eligible to incentive provision) among all investors.
4This reasoning has been applied to competition for investment by Black and Hoyt (1989), Haaparanta
(1996), and in an imperfect competition setup by Janeba (1998).
5See inter alia the core-periphery model of Baldwin and Krugman (2002), or footloose capital models
by Dupont and Martin (2003), and Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2002).
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Two useful insights from this literature are worth mentioning. First, further integration
makes firms even more responsive to profit differentials resulting from incentive provision.
Second, a core country may be able to set a limit tax deterring investment in the periphery.
These two features will be present in our model. However, our focus will be on MNCs
potentially operating several subsidiaries in potentially several countries, as opposed to
single-plant firms as in the above mentioned papers. From another perspective, Haaland
and Wooton (1999) find that providing investment subsidies to foreign-owned multina-
tionals may be in the national interest due to vertical linkages with local suppliers and
agglomeration effects6.
With a limited number of potential foreign investors, countries may compete to attract
them. The welfare analysis of subsidy competition relies upon the assumed attributes of
FDI. For instance, Barros and Cabral (2000) focus on the reduction of unemployment
allowed by the presence of FDI7. Fumagalli (2003) develops a technological argument and
obtains a similar result8, assuming positive externalities emanating from MNC activities9.
Both papers find FDI incentives may be welfare enhancing even in the presence of subsidy
competition between potential and mutually exclusive host countries.
How integration modifies investment decisions has also been extensively studied in
the literature. Norman and Motta (1996) and Neary (2002), for instance, show that
economic integration not only increases FDI but may also shape location patterns. Further
integration towards the completion of a single market may cause MNC location decisions to
be determined by the interplay between a ’tariff-jumping motive’ and an ’export-platform
motive’. The tariff-jumping motive biases the location decision towards operating as many
subsidiaries as there are countries in the single market, while the export-platform motive
pushes for serving the whole market from a single member country.
Location choices are not exclusively influenced either by FDI incentives or by economic
integration alone, but also by the interplay between both. The possibility for a MNC to
relocate and the impact of integration on its location motives necessarily has an influence
on governments’ willingness to offer tax or production incentives. Consequently, there has
been an increasing interest in the interaction between regional integration and fiscal com-
petition recently. Haufler and Wooton (1999) analyze two-country ’auctions’ for foreign
investment and point at the role of country size : due to a home market effect, the largest
country wins the auction10.
Closer to our approach, Raff (2004) investigates the exports vs FDI decision of an extra-
6They assume that MNCs provide employment opportunities and generate demand for domestic inter-
mediate inputs, produced by domestic workers with increasing returns to scale. This explains how MNC
investment raises the net value of domestic production. The desirability of FDI is reinforced in the presence
of agglomeration forces: a first comer, attracted by a subsidy, may induce several to enter, establishing a
complete modern sector.
7An assumption justifiable in a partial equilibrium setting. In such a case the effect of competition
will be positive since the country suffering the most from unemployment will have a higher willingness to
pay for the location of the MNC, and therefore will win the bidding contest: the gain in employment will
outweigh the expense in subsidies and competition will have a positive effect on allocative efficiency.
8With sufficiently large technological differences between countries, the least advanced country should
win the contest, as opposed to what would happen without incentives, and that should improve overall
welfare. Besides, subsidies also bias the export vs. (extra-regional) FDI decision towards FDI, again
improving regional welfare.
9Assuming positive technological externalities arising from FDI, especially within a sector, is not exempt
of controversy (see Devereux and Griffith 2002), all the more in developing countries (Aitken and Harrison,
1999, Kugler, forthcoming and Chudnovsky and Lopez, 2004.)
10In their model with exogenous and identical transport costs, two countries competing to attract a
foreign-owned monopolist offer positive lump-sum profit tax. When governments may count on an addi-
tional instrument, such as a tariff, the profit tax paid in equilibrium rises.
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regional MNC in a two-country region, after the formation of a Free Trade Agreement or a
Customs Union. He shows that trade integration never leads to a reduction in FDI when
governments use bilateral tariffs in conjunction with proportional profit taxes. He also
finds that a regional FTA may lead to lower external tariffs and a reduction in the tax
rates levied by member countries on the profits of multinational firms.
Our approach is complementary to his in the sense that the fiscal instrument we study,
production subsidies, affects output and hence allocative efficiency, creating a role for
strategic subsidization by governments. Besides we relax the implicit assumption of cost-
less profit repatriation. All this leads to different conclusions. In particular, we obtain
a wider array of location possibilities, including duplication of plants under perfect inte-
gration, and find a determining role for ownership in shaping nationally optimal policies
towards FDI. We also incorporate the possibility of regional coordination.
Indeed, the discussion on fiscal competition suggests that the case for regional coor-
dination may straightforwardly be made, due to the existence of a prisoner’s dilemma in
setting national taxes. Haufler and Wooton (2001) investigate the effects of a regionally
coordinated profit tax or location subsidy to a monopolistic and globally mobile firm. In
their model, optimal regional coordination depends on the relative desirability of extract-
ing rents from existing investors with respect to attracting new investors11. We address a
complementary question: how do the gains from coordination depend on the level of re-
gional integration? This question deserves some attention, especially for policy purposes,
since regional coordination might be costly to implement. We identify conditions on re-
gional characteristics for integration to increase the benefits of regional coordination, or,
put another way, the net gains from building regional institutions.
Our model features several points of departure from the literature that might be sum-
marized as follows:
• By incorporating the possibility of relocation we identify a channel through which
regional integration interplays with regional competition for firms.
In a non-integrated region, provided that the MNC prefers FDI to extra-regional
exports, all countries will receive the investment. Regional integration enables the
firm to create a regional export platform in one of the countries.
This potential change in location would translate into a welfare loss or gain for the
countries, which fosters competition for investment. In our framework, investments
are sunk, and the firm may choose to keep both plants or to shut one down and
produce for exports from the other. This complements the literature discussed above,
which mainly analyses pure auctions for new investments.
We obtain a wealth of different types of equilibria that help rationalize excessive
subsidization, as governments will want to deter potential competition by means
of limit-subsidization. This allow us to identify under which circumstances subsidy
competition between integrating economies may lead to an excess of subsidization.
• We also investigate whether there are gains to regional integration once the effect of
fiercer subsidy competition is taken into account.
• We include the geography of capital in the analysis by allowing for two different types
of ownership (intra- or extra-regional) and national absorption of MNC profits. This
11For investments whose realization does not rely upon any kind of coordination, a coordinated tax
allows for appropriating location rents from the firm. On the other hand, a coordinated tax reduction will
attract investment that would not take place when countries act non-cooperatively. Depending on which
motive dominates, regional coordination may result in an increase or reduction in tax levels.
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absorption capacity may be interpreted as a profit repatriation tax or as a particular
measure of the social value of MNC investments.
• We put the normative discussion on subsidy competition into perspective by mea-
suring regional welfare in alternative policy settings, such as mutual interdiction
(harmonization) of subsidies and perfect regional coordination. We also study how
welfare differences vary with the extent of regional integration and assess the poten-
tial net gains to coordination.
3 The Subsidy Game
3.1 Preliminaries
In our model, trade integration allows the MNC to relocate its operations, building an
export platform in the most technologically advanced country. Governments may react
by strategically using production subsidies to prevent or enhance relocation, causing inef-
ficiency in the location of production. First, a country not too backward technologically
may manage to block potential relocation by offering high subsidies. However, this should
lead to welfare losses for the region. Second, competition should be more intense between
symmetric countries, resulting in excessively high amounts of subsidies. Third, the choice
of subsidies by competing governments typically overlooks a positive externality on foreign
consumers and a negative externality on foreign producers.
Regional welfare losses suggest a case for regional regulation. We will consider three
policy options: decentralized, harmonized (zero subsidy regime) and regionally optimal
subsidies. By definition, the latter possibility maximizes regional welfare, but we show
that its benefits increase with regional integration. Indeed, as integration proceeds, more
efficient relocation opportunities are distorted away. We also show that harmonization
dominates a decentralized framework when the MNC is from outside the region.
Formally, the region consists of 2 countries, A and B, whose markets are assumed to be
segmented with a linear inverse demand function. Each market is served by a monopolist.
We allow for 2 different types of ownerships, either a ’regional’ firm belonging to country
A or an extra-regional (’foreign’) firm.
Consistent with our discussion of location decisions, the firm faces two location alter-
natives, reflecting the conflicting influences of the tariff-jumping motive and the export-
platform motive. On the one hand, the MNC may want to operate one subsidiary in each
country, jumping over tariff barriers: we call this location choice ubiquity (U for short). On
the other hand, it may prefer to build an export platform in a single country, to serve the
other country through exports: we call this concentration (C). Without loss of generality
we will only allow for concentration in country A, which amounts to calling A the country
that ’wins’ the bidding game.
The location choice of the MNC depends on host countries’ characteristics: market
size, as in Haufler and Wooton (1999), but also institutional settings, and technological
characteristics. Although our framework is tractable enough to incorporate any of the
mentioned sources of country heterogeneity, we focus on the last one. In particular, we
assume that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. Hence the costs
for the MNC of serving the home market j, and the export market k, respectively, equal
Cjj = (αj − sj) qjj
Cjk = (αj − sj + t) qjk
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The constant marginal cost is country-specific and may be decomposed between an
exogenous component, αj , and an endogenous subsidy sj chosen by government j12. As
for t, it is the Union’s common internal tariff, with regional integration modelled as a
reduction in t.
Monopoly profits in each market j are pij = (qjj)2 = 14(A− αj + sj)2 if the market is
served by regional production and pij = (qjk)2 = 14(A − αj + sj − t)2 when market k is
served by means of exports from j. As markets are segmented, regional profits (Π) are
simply the sum of profits made in each market. Regional MNC profits are reported in
Table 1.
Table 1: Regional MNC profits by location and ownership
U, regional MNC ΠU,R(sA, sB) 14 [(A− αA + sA)2 + (1− φ)(A− αB + sB)2]
C, regional MNC ΠC,R(sA, sB) 14 [(A− αA + sA)2 + (A− αA + sA − t)2]
U, extra-regional MNC ΠU,ER(sA, sB) (1−φ)4 [(A− αA + sA)2 + (A− αB + sB)2]
C, extra-regional MNC ΠC,ER(sA, sB) (1−φ)4 [(A− αA + sA)2 + (A− αA + sA − t)2]
Note that the relative advantage of a location over the other depends on the internal
tariff (t), technological differences (α’s) and subsidies (sj). φ stands for the ability of
each nation to appropriate some part of the MNC’s profit as national welfare, through a
profit tax or the distribution of the affiliate’s profits to local residents. From the MNC
headquarters’ viewpoint, (1 − φ) measures the profit repatriation rate. With little effort,
we can also consider φ as a non-appropriable (proportional to profit) externality to the
host country, whose generating process we do not model. For instance, φpij could be the
benefit from an investment in training j’s local workforce. Henceforth, we refer to φ as
local absorption. In order to focus on differences in production characteristics, we assume
φ to be identical between countries13.
As countries’ decisions depend crucially on the form of the objective function, we
assume it to be as general as possible: national welfare will amount to the sum of consumer
surplus, some part of the MNC’s producer surplus, and government surplus, i.e. tariff
revenue minus the cost of subsidies. Table 2 displays welfare functions for each type of
location and ownership.
Notice that firm ownership matters for the producer surplus except for the special case
of φ = 1. When the MNC is regional, country A is relatively more willing to offer subsidies.
This will affect the subsidy game and, compared with the case of an extra-regional MNC,
lead to different equilibria.
Given our assumptions on market structure and demand, concavity of total welfare
functions with respect to subsidies is always assured. Therefore, a welfare maximizing
subsidy for each location choice exists.
We model the interaction between governments and the MNC as a two-stage non-
cooperative game.
12In our partial equilibrium setting a marginal cost-reducing subsidy acts as a reduction of the cost
of capital (with a linear homogenous production function), or any fiscal or indirect subsidy related to
output. It should be noted that subsidy competition resulting in negative optimal subsidies (taxes), is not
equivalent to fiscal competition, since this typically involves corporate profit taxes. This will be captured
by our variable φ, as explained below.
13How heroic this assumption is depends on the way φ is interpreted. For instance, in the fiscal inter-
pretation, evidence suggests convergence in corporate tax rates in the EU. See Devereux, Lockwood and
Redoano (2004).
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Table 2: Welfare functions by location and ownership
Regional MNC
W j = CSj + PSj + GSj CS PS GS
Ubiquity, Country A 12 (
A−αA+sA
2 )
2 (A−αA+sA2 )
2 + [1− φ](A−αB+sB2 )2 −sA(A−αA+sA2 )
Concentration, Country A 12 (
A−αA+sA
2 )
2 (A−αA+sA2 )
2 + (A−αA+sA−t2 )
2 −sA( 2A−2αA+2sA−t2 )
Ubiquity, Country B 12 (
A−αB+sB
2 )
2 φ(A−αB+sB2 )
2 −sB(A−αB+sB2 )
Concentration, Country B 12 (
A−αA+sA−t
2 )
2 0 t(A−αA+sA−t2 )
Extra-regional MNC
Ubiquity, Country A 12 (
A−αA+sA
2 )
2 φ(A−αA+sA2 )
2 −sA(A−αA+sA2 )
Concentration, Country A 12 (
A−αA+sA
2 )
2 φ[(A−αA+sA2 )
2 + (A−αA+sA−t2 )
2] −sA( 2A−2αA+2sA−t2 )
Ubiquity, Country B 12 (
A−αB+sB
2 )
2 φ(A−αB+sB2 )
2 −sB(A−αB+sB2 )
Concentration, Country B 12 (
A−αA+sA−t
2 )
2 0 t(A−αA+sA−t2 )
• In the first stage, governments A and B choose their subsidy levels sA and sB.
• In the second stage, the MNC chooses a location R between alternatives U and C.
This formalization captures both the non-cooperative aspect of subsidy competition
and the ability enjoyed by governments to credibly commit to a certain amount of subsi-
dies14.
The solution to that game will be denoted by a triple composed of a location regime cho-
sen by the MNC and two amounts of unit subsidies offered by the governments {R, sA, sB}.
We now turn to the governments’ objective function to characterize the set of optimal sub-
sidies.
3.2 Characterization of equilibria
The two-stage game is solved by backward induction, looking for sub-game perfect equilib-
ria. The solution is essentially the same in the ’regional MNC’ and ’extra-regional MNC’
cases.
3.2.1 In the second stage
The MNC chooses its location R so as to maximize its regional profits, which we may write
as the best-reply function R∗ = R (sA, sB) satisfyingΠMNC(sA, sB, R∗) ≥ ΠMNC(sA, sB, R)
for all R $= R∗ in {U,C}.
In both ’regional MNC’ and ’extra-regional MNC’ frameworks this best-reply function
may be illustrated by a straight line in {sA, sB} space. In general, the profit differential
between ubiquity and concentration, conditional on subsidies sA and sB, is given by
∆Π(sA, sB) = (1− φ)14(A− αB + sB)
2 − 1
4
(A− αA + sA − t)2
in the regional MNC scenario and
14Credibility is an important assumption, as in one case government A would gain from reneging on
its commitment. In real economic situations, reputational concerns with respect to potential investors
(beyond the scope of this paper) may arguably be enough to alleviate the credibility problem.
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Figure 1: The MNC’s location choice according to first-stage subsidies
sA
sB
sA(sB)
~
C is preferred
U is preferred
∆Π(sA, sB) = (1− φ)
[
1
4
(A− αB + sB)2 − 14(A− αA + sA − t)
2
]
in the extra-regional MNC scenario (see Table 1). We may express this basic comparison
between profits from home-based exports and local operations by computing subsidy pairs
that leave the MNC indifferent between locations. Denote by s˜A(sB) the function plotting
the indifference subsidy from government A for a given sB, and s˜B(sA) the inverse function.
Straightforward calculations yield
s˜A(sB) =
(√
1− φ
)
sB − (A− αA) + (
√
1− φ) (A− αB) + t (1)
in the regional MNC scenario and
s˜A(sB) = sB + αA − αB + t (2)
in the extra-regional MNC scenario. Figure 1 represents the graph of this function15.
3.2.2 In the first stage
Governments choose subsidy levels simultaneously. At a sub-game perfect equilibrium,
the subsidy of one government should maximize its continuation payoff given the other
government’s subsidy. Note that in the case when subsidies posted by governments make
the MNC indifferent, we consider ubiquity as the status quo.
Government B’s best reply
By defining soptB (U) = argmaxsB
{WB(sA, sB, U)} we obtain
soptB (U) =
2φ− 1
3− 2φ(A− αB)
15The function is defined over the real interval, thus allowing for negative subsidies (taxes). For exposi-
tional simplicity we choose to plot them in the positive quadrant.
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Figure 2: Government B’s best-reply schedule
sA
sB
sA(sB)
~
C is preferred
U is preferred
sBoptU
s’A
sB*(sA)
This is government B’s best-reply to all sA lower than s˜A(s
opt
B (U)) in both ’regional’
and ’extra-regional’ scenarios, which, it should be noted, does not depend on the other gov-
ernment’s subsidy. That is, some part of the best-reply function will be vertical. Whenever
sA < s˜A(s
opt
B (U)), B should choose between facing relocation or setting a limit subsidy
inducing ubiquity. The latter must be s˜B(sA), since this is the lowest subsidy inducing
ubiquity and above soptB (U) we are on the decreasing part of the bell-shaped welfare curve.
Lastly, above a certain subsidy set by government A, it may well be that country B prefers
concentration since high subsidies from A increase consumer surplus in B.
To see this in more detail, let us compute the subsidy from government A that makes
government B indifferent between concentration and ubiquity. Denote it by s′A. Using
Table 2, the particular subsidy level such that WB(s
opt
B (U), U) = WB(sA, C) is given by
s′A =
(
2√
3− 2φ
)√
(A− αB)2 + (3− 2φ)t2 − (A− αA)− t (3)
Any subsidy higher than s′A makes concentration more desirable than ubiquity for
government B. Note that this threshold subsidy is the same in both foreign and regional
MNC scenarios.
Summarizing, we have the following best-reply schedule for government B, pictured in
Figure 2 :
s∗B(sA, R
∗(sA, sB)) =
 s
opt
B (U) if sA ≤ s˜A(soptB (U))
s˜B(sA) if s′A ≥ sA > s˜A(soptB (U))
any sB s.t. sB < s˜B(s′A) if sA > s
′
A
Government A’s best reply
We proceed in a similar manner by defining
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soptA (U) = argmaxsA
{WA(sA, sB, U)} = A− αA
soptA (C) = argmaxsA
{WA(sA, sB, C)} = A− αA3
in the case of a regional MNC and
soptA (U) =
2φ− 1
3− 2φ(A− αA)
soptA (C) =
4φ− 3
7− 4φ(A− αA) + 2t
1− φ
7− 4φ
in the case of an ’extra-regional’ MNC. Let us first see why government A’s best-reply
schedule has a three-part structure16.
First, against that interval of sB where s
opt
A (C) yields concentration, that subsidy is
clearly a best-reply to sB if it welfare-dominates ubiquity with suboptimal subsidies.
Second, consider the case where WA(s
opt
A (C), C) > WA(s
opt
A (U), s
opt
B (U), U). Not-
ing that WA(sA, C) has an inverted U shape, and decreases with sA for values higher
than soptA (C), there must be a threshold sA > s
opt
A (C) above which ubiquity is pre-
ferred, i.e. WA(sA, C) = maxsA
{
WA(sA, s
opt
B (U), U)
}
. Similarly, in the opposite case
where WA(s
opt
A (C), C) ≤ WA(soptA (U), soptB (U), U) there exists a sA > soptA (C) such that
WA(sA, s˜B(sA), U) = maxsA {WA(sA, C)}. The existence of these threshold subsidies im-
plies a switch in preferred locations by governments in this ’second’ part of their best-reply
schedule.
Lastly, against that interval of sB where s
opt
A (U) yields ubiquity, that subsidy is clearly
a best-reply to sB if it welfare-dominates concentration with suboptimal subsidies.
Intuitively, the overall shape of government A’s best-reply schedule ultimately depends
on the comparison between welfare under ubiquity and concentration. Provided no regime
unambiguously welfare-dominates the other for all possible subsidy levels, we obtain this
three-part structure. In the following section, we will enumerate conditions on welfare
functions and subsidies that put more structure on best-reply schedules and allow for a
precise characterization of equilibrium.
Before we turn to these conditions, let us construct an illustrative example. Suppose
that WA(s
opt
A (C), C) > WA(s
opt
A (U), s
opt
B (U), U). This may in particular be the case for
low trade barriers, or substantial technological backwardness of country B.
Against that interval of sB where s
opt
A (C) yields concentration, that subsidy is clearly
a best-reply to sB. The threshold subsidy sA such that ubiquity is preferred is given by
WA(sA, C) =
(A−αA)2
2(3−2φ) in the extra-regional MNC scenario and WA(sA, C) =
(A−αA)2
2 +
(1−φ)(A−αB)2
(3−2φ)2 in the regional MNC scenario. At this point, there is a switch from the best-
reply function to the profit indifference frontier. Finally, if the difference between maximal
welfare under ubiquity and welfare under concentration with suboptimal subsidies is low
enough, we obtain the following best-reply function for government A:
s∗A(sB, R
∗(sA, sB)) =

soptA (C) if sB ≤ s˜B(soptA (C))
s˜A(sB)− ε if s˜B(sA) ≥ sB > s˜B(soptA (C))
soptA (U) if sB > s˜B(sA)
where ε may be arbitrarily small. Figure 3 shows government A’s best-reply map.
16To save space, we will only address here the case where soptA (C) is lower than s
opt
A (U). The opposite
case lends itself to a similar reasoning.
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Figure 3: Government A’s best-reply schedule
sA
sB
sA(sB)
~
C is preferred
U is preferredsAoptC
sAoptU
sA*(sB)
We now turn to the conditions for existence of an equilibrium in the sequential game.
3.2.3 Existence of equilibrium
Careful examination of the potential intersections of both best reply schedules leads us to
investigate the existence of the four following types of candidate equilibria :
• A U1 equilibrium yielding ubiquity where the vertical part of B’s reply intersects
the horizontal part of A’s reply in the Ubiquity zone.
• A C1 equilibrium yielding concentration where the vertical part of B’s reply intersects
the horizontal part of A’s reply in the Concentration zone.
• A C2 equilibrium yielding concentration, with both governments bidding higher
subsidies than in the C1 equilibrium levels, where the part of A’s best reply line
closely parallel to the MNC indifference line (s˜A(sB)) intersects B’s reply curve in
its vertical component.
• A U2 equilibrium yielding ubiquity, with government B bidding a higher subsidy
than in the U1 equilibrium in order to prevent relocation in country A.
Let us now identify the conditions for existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in the
subsidy game.
Proposition 1 Consider the following set of conditions:
1. soptA C ≥ s′A
2. WA(soptA U, s
opt
B U,U) ≥WA(soptA C,C)
3. WA(soptA U, s
opt
B U,U) ≥WA(s′A, C)
4. Π(soptA U, s
opt
B U,U) > Π(s
opt
A U, s
opt
B U,C)
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5. soptA U ≤ s′A
6. WA(s′A, s˜B(s′A), U) ≥WA(s′A + %, C)
This set of conditions is logically sufficient to determine the existence of either type of
equilibrium. The determination of equilibria is given by the following diagram.
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Figure 4: Conditions 1-6 and the existence of equilibrium
Proof. See Appendix A1.
We pause now to give some intuition on Proposition 1 and the determination of equi-
libria in the subsidy game.
The most important condition is Condition 1, that determines whether concentra-
tion/relocation with optimal subsidies for country A is acceptable to country B. In this
model, governments will generally compete for investment, since the social benefit to the
MNC’s presence is higher consumer surplus plus a share of profits. However, concentra-
tion/relocation may be a good option for the ’losing’ country if it implies large efficiency
gains that are passed through to the consumers, and ultimately depends on the amount
of subsidy spent by the ’winning’ government. Hence the role of s′A. In graphical terms,
this means that government B’s best-reply schedule will always have a vertical component.
To summarize, Condition 1 tells us where governments’ best-reply curves intersect in the
subspace where concentration obtains.
When Condition 1 holds, then either government A may not increase welfare under
concentration (Condition 2 does not hold and we have the simple C1 equilibrium), or
government A may reach a higher welfare level under ubiquity, despite higher subsidies
from the rival government (U2 equilibrium). When Condition 1 does not hold, then a C1
equilibrium is not possible, but all other types of equilibria exist, depending on government
A’s comparison between welfare under concentration with suboptimal subsidization, and
welfare under ubiquity. Table 3 displays Conditions 1− 6 expressed in parameter values.
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Table 3: Conditions for existence of different equilibria in the Subsidy Game expressed in
parameter values
Extra-regional MNC
1 t ≥ 23−2φ (αB − αA)
2 t ≥ 2
r
(A−αA)2(1−2φ)2(7−4φ)
12−8φ −3(A−αA)
2φ2−3φ−2
3 12
(A−αA)2
3−2φ ≥ ( 12 + φ)(Ω(t)− t2 )2 − (Ω(t)− t2 )(2Ω(t)− (A− αA)− t)
where Ω(t) =
q
(A−αB)2
3−2φ + t
2
4 A− αA ≤
√
3− 2φ(A− αB)
5 t ≥
(A−αB)(7−4φ)√
3−2φ −2(A−αA)
1−φ
6 t ≥ 2(A−αA)(3−2φ)−
√
4−(A−αA)2(3−2φ)2−16(A−αa)2(3−sφ)2(1−φ)φ
2(3−2φ)2φ
t ≤ 2(A−αA)(3−2φ)+
√
4−(A−αA)2(3−2φ)2−16(A−αa)2(3−sφ)2(1−φ)φ
2(3−2φ)2φ
Regional MNC
1 t ≥ 2(A− αA)− 2
√
1−φ
3−2φ (A− αB)
2 t ≤ A− αA −
√
1
3 (A− αA)2 + 4 (A−αB)
2(1−φ)
(3−2φ)2
3 12 (A− αA)2 + (1− φ)(A−αB3−2φ )2 ≥ 32 (Ω(t)− t2 )2 − (Ω(t)− t2 )(2Ω(t)− (A− αA)− t)
where Ω(t) =
q
(A−αB)2
3−2φ + t
2
4 A− αA ≤ A−αB√3−2φ
5 23 (A− αA) ≤ A−αB√3−2φ
6 t ≤ (2A−αA−
√
1−φ(αB−1))2
2A−αA−2
√
1−φ(αB−1)
3.3 Discussion
We have now fully characterized the equilibria of this game. Conditions 1 − 6 and the
tree diagram enable us to easily determine the prevailing equilibrium for different levels of
regional integration, ownership, local absorption and regional technological differences.
Despite a simple formalization, with the property that for a given location regime
welfare-maximizing subsidies do not depend on the other government’s subsidy, we have
ended up with a wealth of equilibria. This results from the sequential game setup. In a
simultaneous game, only U1 and C1 equilibria would appear17. The C2 equilibrium, that
exhibits subsidies in excess of the C1 simultaneous-game outcome, would only occur in
a sequential game, where governments are able to credibly commit to announced subsidy
levels. C2 helps us rationalize the observed tendency to excess subsidization from gov-
ernmental agencies, mentioned in the introduction. A similar remark applies to U2 and
U1.
As appears clearly from the above conditions, which equilibrium eventually obtains
depends on MNC ownership and on three features of the regional union: technological
asymmetries between countries (αi), the extent of local absorption (φ), and internal trade
barriers (t). For instance, an equilibrium with concentration is more likely to occur when-
ever asymmetries are substantial, absorption is high, and trade barriers are low. To focus
on regional integration, it also straightforwardly appears that sufficiently high levels of t
imply an equilibrium with ubiquity (U1 to be more specific). We defer to Appendix A1 a
17In fact, the same subsidies would have been offered in a simultaneous game between a single government
and the MNC
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discussion on how the threshold tariffs depends on the parameters and the type of subsidy
competition. What is interesting to bear in mind is that deepening regional integration is
likely to make the region switch to another equilibrium.
We are now in a position to adapt our general framework to special cases of regional
unions.
4 Applications
Public policy towards FDI may take various forms in an integrating region, according to
the degree of regional coordination. To explore this, we define 3 alternative policy options
for a regional union :
• Decentralized integration, under which countries compete in subsidies to influence
the MNC’s location choice.
• Harmonized integration, under which governments commit themselves to a weak
form of coordination, namely zero subsidy. This situation amounts to the mutual
interdiction of investment incentives.
• Coordinated integration, under which countries cooperatively set subsidy levels that
maximize regional welfare, mimicking a benevolent supranational social planner.
’Regionally optimal’ subsidies, conditional on each regime R, are denoted by sregj (R)
and maximize the sum of both countries’ national welfare for a given location regime
(a formal treatment is given in Appendix A2).
At this point we can address the following key questions:
1. How does the integration process modify firm location in the presence of subsidy
competition? (section 4.1)
2. How and when does subsidy competition improve on harmonization ? (section 4.2)
3. Does subsidy competition jeopardize the gains from trade integration ? (section
4.3.1)
4. Does regional integration increase the reward to subsidy coordination ? (section
4.3.2)
4.1 Location choice and integration
We explore here the prevailing location choice after regional integration. Intuitively, in the
absence of trade, a MNC would set up an affiliate in each nation18: for a large enough tariff,
the tariff-jumping motive dominates the export platform motive. But with heterogeneous
country-specific production characteristics, lower tariffs allow the MNC to concentrate
production in the most convenient country and serve both markets from there. Therefore,
with different countries and costless relocation, full regional integration (t = 0) implies
concentration in a harmonized as well as in a coordinated region. Conversely, in both
cases, with identical countries in terms of production, integration will not be accompanied
by relocation.
18Remember that we do not consider the possibility of exports from outside the region.
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Under subsidy competition the location choice is a bit less straightforward to pre-
dict. Basically, we need to evaluate Conditions 1 − 6 at t = 0 and to find the prevailing
equilibrium.
To introduce regional characteristics, we need to set some values for a few parameters.
For technologically symmetric countries we normalize αA = αB = 0 and for asymmetric
countries we set αA = 0 and αB > 0. As for the level of MNC profit appropriation, we
consider low absorption through the extreme case of φ = 0 and high absorption by setting
φ = 1. Careful analysis of the set of equilibria leads us to determine analytically the MNC
location choice at full integration, as summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Under perfect trade integration, allowing for free subsidy competition be-
tween governments typically affects the location choice by the MNC, compared to its choice
under subsidy harmonization or coordination. Specifically, Table 4 displays the different
equilibria under perfect integration.
Table 4: Prevailing equilibrium under perfect integration
Agreement
Decentralized Harmonized Coordinated
Regional MNC
Region Repatriation Equilibrium
Symmetric low C2 U1 U1
high C1 U1 U1
Asymmetric low C2 if asymmetry is low (αB ≤ A3 ) C1 C1
C1 otherwise
high C1 C1 C1
Extra-regional MNC
Symmetric low U1 U1 U1
high U1 U1 U1
Asymmetric low U2 if asymmetry is low (αB ≤ A3 ) C1 C1
C1 otherwise
high U2 if asymmetry is low (αB ≤ A2 ) C1 C1
C1 otherwise
Proof. Evaluation of conditions 1−6 expressed in Table 3 at t = 0 is a straightforward
but tedious task, which we defer to Appendix A2.
What Table 4 tells us is that, under perfect regional integration, subsidy competition
generally leads to equilibria that differ from those of harmonization and coordination.
Indeed, subsidy harmonization or even coordination makes U1 optimal for a symmetric
region, and C1 for an asymmetric region : given negligible trade costs, relocation requires
lower local production costs. In contrast, decentralized (competitive) subsidization en-
ables the high-cost country’s government to influence location decisions : we predict that
an ’extra-regional’ MNC will not relocate because of competition from the ’high-cost’ gov-
ernment (U2 equilibrium) ; conversely, a ’regional’ MNC will relocate, but benefit from
sub-optimally high subsidies from the low-cost location’s government (C2 equilibrium).
The difference is due to profit appropriation by nation A in the ’regional’ case, which al-
lows for higher subsidies, which in turn benefit the other location’s consumer and tempers
competition between governments.
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Discussion In various types of regions, the prevailing equilibrium under perfect integra-
tion is characterized by subsidization in excess of its level in the absence of competition: a
C2 type of equilibrium when the MNC is regionally owned and U2 when it is extra-regional.
Indeed, deepening integration favors the export-platform motive, increasing governments’
willingness to subsidize beyond their optimal levels, resulting in an efficiency loss.
Excessive subsidization of an extra-regional MNC always obtains, except for the polar
case of technologically similar countries. The slightest difference in technologies will lead
to a U2 equilibrium. This result also suggests that subsidy competition may jeopardize the
gains from trade associated with regional integration (see subsection 4.3.1). Integration in
this case would only invigorate competition for MNC location.
Excessive subsidization of a regional MNC is unlikelier. whether the equilibrium is
C2 or C1 depends on the level of repatriation, a low repatriation (high φ) implying a
C2 equilibrium, and hence an excess of subsidization. For this reason it is interesting to
identify the value of φ that is sufficient to make the region switch to a C2 equilibrium. As
Conditions 3 and 2 are never satisfied, we simply have to find the value of φ that makes
Condition 1 be satisfied19. Simple inspection of Condition 1 at t = 0 shows that this
condition is satisfied whenever φ < 3(A
2+6AαB−3α2B)
8A2 . Therefore a C2 equilibrium is likely
to prevail when a sufficiently important part of MNC profits are appropriated by the host
country.
How restrictive this condition might be clearly depends on the level of regional asym-
metry. For instance, for a region made up of similar countries, Condition 1 is satisfied for
φ > 38 which shows that a C2 is compatible with a high level of repatriation. As regional
asymmetry increases, the existence of a C2 equilibrium relies on low levels of repatriation.
Note that in the case of a regional MNC subsidy competition does not avoid relocation
when the countries integrate. The main effect in this case is to generate excessive subsi-
dization.
4.2 Subsidy Competition and Welfare
We have identified situations where subsidy competition makes governments exceed their
preferred expenditure level. However, this does not imply that countries should necessarily
avoid offering subsidies. To make this point, we compare subsidy competition and weak
coordination (harmonization at a zero subsidy level) from a regional welfare point of view.
Our review of the literature suggests we should expect subsidy competition to be welfare-
improving with respect to no intervention. In our framework this is typically the case of a
regionally-owned MNC. However, when the MNC is extra-regional we obtain an opposite
result.
Proposition 3 Unconstrained subsidy competition increases regional welfare compared to
a zero subsidy commitment (harmonization) when the MNC belongs to the region. To
the contrary, harmonization is welfare-improving over subsidy competition when the MNC
belongs to an out-of-block country.
Proof.
We defer the proof to Appendix A3.
The intuition is as follows. In the case of an extra-regional MNC, whether the decentral-
ized outcome (equilibrium U2) welfare-dominates the harmonized outcome (C1) depends
19Remember from our previous discussion (see Figure 4) that should this happen, the prevailing equi-
librium would be C1
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on local production cost differences. A moderately high difference suffices for harmoniza-
tion to improve on decentralized competition, since the latter prevents efficient relocation.
When the difference is low, the result holds only for intermediate levels of profit repatria-
tion. In the case of a ’regional’ MNC, the location decision is not affected by competition.
Subsidy expenditure from the host government rises too much, but harmonization may
not lead to a global improvement. Indeed, the high-cost location’s consumers benefit from
highly subsidized imports from the other location. Hence no decisive intervention from
their government.
This result is interesting for policy matters, as it shows that it is in the interest of the
region to find coordination rules (even in a weak form) among partner countries in order
to fully enjoy the benefits from trade integration.
4.3 The effects of integration
Let us move on now on to the second and third of our key questions.
4.3.1 Is integration under subsidy competition welfare reducing?
We have shown that subsidy competition may actually lead to welfare losses. This raises
the question of whether there are any gains from trade to be expected from regional
integration.
Proposition 4 Decentralized regional integration increases regional welfare with respect
to autarky when the MNC belongs to the region. To the contrary, it leads to welfare losses
when the MNC belongs to a country outside the region.
Proof. See Appendix A4.
Our framework allows us to focus on gains from trade due to efficient relocation. We
predict that subsidy competition prevents such relocation in the case of an extra-regional
MNC. Hence no gains from trade are to be expected. Conversely, subsidy competition
does allow for relocation, and hence for gains from trade, in the case of a regional MNC.
This rather straightforward result paves the way for a broader welfare assessment, which
is the subject of the next section.
Before we turn to this, a comment is in order. Our welfare comparison involved perfect
integration with subsidies and autarky with subsidies. We find this ’sophisticated’ autarkic
benchmark to be more relevant for governments considering regional integration while
being aware of potential losses from subsidy competition. Integration in the ’extra-regional
MNC’ case creates a possibility of relocation off the equilibrium path, leading to higher
subsidy levels, and welfare losses.
4.3.2 Does the gain from cooperation increase with regional integration?
Harmonization seems to be a focal point from a policy point of view; however, this should
only be a natural first step in a broader three-policy comparison.
Indeed, in a theoretical analysis of MNCs enjoying market power in subregional mar-
kets, the zero subsidy benchmark is no reference from a welfare viewpoint. In our model,
a non-zero subsidy level maximizing regional welfare always exists. This leads us to ex-
amine the admittedly extreme case of both governments coordinating on regional-welfare
maximizing subsidy levels. This will provide an upper bound on the extent of potential
gains from coordination.
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Having defined a measure of these gains from coordination, we may now examine how
they vary with trade integration, recalling that trade barriers are exogenous to our model.
As a first step, consider a move from autarky to freer trade.
Proposition 5 Starting from autarky, a tariff decrease that is sufficient to affect the
location choice creates a gain from coordination, i.e. a positive difference in regional
welfare between subsidy coordination and competition.
Proof. See Appendix A5.
As we know, the U1 equilibrium prevails under autarky, while all other equilibria are
conditional on trade integration. Therefore, there is no scope for gains from coordination
under autarky. In contrast, integration may cause a welfare change due to the divergence
between national governments’ and a supranational authority’s welfare objectives, be it
simply a change in subsidy levels or even a change in location. In other words, we know
that a reduction of trade barriers starting from autarky raises the extent of welfare gains
from coordination.
Turning now to the case of low trade barriers, we would like to understand how and
when welfare gains from coordination increase with further trade integration. This com-
parative statics exercise involves the derivative of the regional welfare differential between
coordination and subsidy competition with respect to t, the internal tariff.
Proposition 6 Welfare gains from coordination, evaluated at perfect integration :
1. are maximal for an extra-regional MNC
2. may be at a maximum for a strictly positive tariff level, when the MNC belongs to
the region.
Proof. See Appendix A6
For each part of the Proposition, we first discuss the intuition behind the result, and
then the implications for economic policy.
This proposition first shows, in the case of an extra-regional MNC, that the gain
to the coordination of subsidization policies increases as regional integration proceeds.
Intuitively, an export platform strategy becomes more attractive with deeper regional
integration, which raises the payoff to reorganizing the extra-regional MNC’s regional
production facilities into a single location through subsidies. But government intervention
under subsidy competition induces the MNC to choose ubiquity, so that regional welfare
does not depend on trade openness. In that sense subsidy competition eliminates some
new location possibilities made possible by integration.
The creation of a supranational institution coordinating subsidy expenses among mem-
ber States should be all the more desirable as regional integration proceeds. Considering
trade policy in conjunction with related policies such as investment incentives, this result
confirms that the interaction between both policies may raise the payoff to implementing
one particular policy.
Second, in the case of a regional MNC, the effect of trade integration on the gains
to coordination is non-monotonic. In particular, a move towards full integration reduces
these gains. To gain some intuition about this result, recall that both cooperative (C1)
and non-cooperative (C1 or C2) equilibrium subsidies make the concentration regime
more advantageous for the MNC at full integration. In other words, subsidy competition
does not prevent the MNC from exploiting the new location possibility made available
by regional integration. Compared to the ’extra-regional MNC case’, this result is now
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due to the fundamental asymmetry between the origin country of the MNC and the other
country, the former having an additional motive for subsidization.
In particular, when integration is less than perfect, we may distinguish between C1
and C2 equilibria. In the former case, the only difference between subsidy competition
and coordination is the concern for B’s consumers by the fictitious social planner. This
implies that tariff reductions allow for smaller coordination subsidies, while competitive
subsidies are unaffected, lessening potential gains from coordination. In the case of a C2
equilibrium, a tariff reduction has more complex effects on governments’ best responses.
Straightforward calculations show that C2 subsidies are decreasing with the level of tariff
barriers compared to regionally optimal subsidies, while the latter are consistently higher
and increasing. This is intuitive since the C2 subsidy makes B indifferent between lo-
cations, which is less costly with low trade barriers ; in contrast, as explained above,
regionally optimal subsidies increase with trade barriers. Therefore under subsidy com-
petition, the deviation from the regional optimum benchmark gradually vanishes in the
course of trade integration.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated the effects of subsidy competition in situations where regional inte-
gration modifies the location motives of a MNC.
Our starting point has been the analysis of a subsidy game in a two-country model
where the reduction of trade barriers enhances national incentives to offer production
subsidies. We show how sufficiently high integration levels entail equilibria characterized
by an excess of subsidization with respect to the autarkic case.
MNC location under free trade within the region depends on ownership. In equilibrium,
an extra-regional MNC will serve the region from existing subsidiaries in each country. A
regionally-owned MNC will relocate its operations and serve the region from an export
platform, except in the limit case where production costs are identical in both countries.
An excess of subsidization does not necessarily mean that countries are not to gain
from regional integration. Only in the case of an extra-regional MNC does intense subsidy
competition prevent the region from specialization. In that case, reducing trade barriers
intensifies subsidy competition, leading to excessively high subsidies, but this does not
lead the MNC to concentrate its operations. In contrast, when the MNC is regional and
for a relatively low level of technological asymmetry, excessive subsidization also occurs
and involves relocation, which is efficient for the region.
We find mixed results for the welfare gains from subsidy harmonization in an integrated
region, depending on MNC ownership and regional characteristics. We show that for the
case of an extra-regional MNC, harmonization generally dominates subsidy competition
in terms of regional welfare. This result is conditional on the level of regional asymmetry
and profit repatriation. Harmonization is likelier to make the region better off when
regional asymmetry is high (αB > 14A). For low levels of asymmetry, repatriation must
be in an intermediate range for harmonization to dominate subsidy competition. This
is an original result, as well as an interesting one for policy purposes, as it shows that
simple harmonization may be the relevant second best policy when regional coordination
is difficult to implement.
While we do not discuss the political feasibility of coordination, we still show that
building the appropriate regional institutions may be crucial for the region to enjoy gains
from regional integration. Moreover, we show how a reduction of trade barriers, starting
from autarky, raises the extent of welfare gains from coordination. This is so since integra-
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tion causes a divergence between national governments’ and a supranational authority’s
welfare objectives, or even a change in location choices that results in regionally suboptimal
outcomes. In addition, when the MNC is extra-regional, we show that the highest gain to
regional coordination is achieved when integration is fully completed. The monotonicity of
this gain from regional coordination as integration proceeds is interesting from the point
of view of integrating processes among developing countries, highly characterized by the
presence of extraregional MNCs. Our result suggests that in a gradual integration process,
the cost of building institutions may later be recouped by gains from further integration.
Our theoretical framework is sufficiently general to adapt to be applied to the speci-
ficities of various regions and economic unions, such as Mercosur (which resembles our
extra-regional MNC case in a heterogenous region with incipient efforts of harmoniza-
tion), the former 15-country European Union (a relatively homogenous region, with both
regional and extraregional MNCs, and some coordination between partner countries), the
25-country EU (relatively more asymmetric), and the NAFTA (an asymmetric region with
no explicit regional coordination).
Our findings are sensitive to firm ownership, regional technological heterogeneity, ab-
sorption capability of governments, and, furthermore, to the kind of agreement between
countries. No analysis of the role played by country size has been carried out. Nor have
we analyzed the case in which repatriation levels are endogenously determined by govern-
ments or extended our framework to the case of multiple firms (as we do in Albornoz and
Corcos, 2004). We leave these complementary tasks to future research.
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Appendix A1: Proof of Proposition 1
The above mentioned seven conditions fully characterize best-reply functions and their intersections
in {sA, sB} space. The tree diagram follows from careful inspection of all possible intersections.
In this proof, we will go through some steps to characterize necessary conditions for the existence
of qualitatively different types of equilibria.
U1 equilibrium (soptA U, s
opt
B U,U)
• MNC
By backward induction, it must be optimal for the MNC to choose U in the second stage, i.e.
given these subsidies, Ubiquity profits must be higher than concentration profits. Hence Condition
4 :
Π(soptA U, s
opt
B U,U) > Π(s
opt
A U, s
opt
B U,C) (Condition 4)
Under this condition, choosing ubiquity indeed maximizes the MNC’s second-stage payoff. But
when does our candidate equilibrium belong to governments’ best replies ?
• Government A
Let us start with government A, facing soptB U . By construction, no subsidy conducive to
ubiquity could dominate this candidate equilibrium subsidy. Recall now that s′A is the exact
subsidy from A that makes government B indifferent between concentration and U1 ubiquity. In
order to induce concentration, Government A could thus offer a subsidy equal to max{s′A, soptA C},
knowing that it will be unmatched by the rival government. We should now check whether this
strategy pays off more for A than the candidate equilibrium strategy. If not, then against soptB U
no other subsidy may dominate the candidate equilibrium subsidy. To achieve this, we first need
to examine Condition 1:
soptA C ≥ s′A (Condition 1)
If Condition 1 is met, then for U1 to be an equilibrium it is necessary that the following
condition, Condition 2, hold :
WA(soptA U, s
opt
B U,U) ≥WA(soptA C,C) (Condition 2)
If, to the contrary, Condition 1 is not met, then for U1 to be an equilibrium it is still necessary
that Condition 2 be met, and also that the following condition, Condition 3, hold
WA(soptA U, s
opt
B U,U) ≥WA(s′A, C) (Condition 3)
Conditions 2 and 3 ensure that against soptB U , no subsidy conducive to concentration (even
outside the equilibrium set) may be preferred by government A. Hence under these conditions the
candidate equilibrium subsidy is government A’s best-reply to soptB U .
• Government B
To complete the proof of existence of equilibrium U1, we need to examine government B’s best-
reply to soptA U . Again, by construction, s
opt
B U dominates any other subsidy conducive to ubiquity.
It must therefore be checked that setting an sB conducive to concentration, against soptA U , does
not yield a higher payoff.
This simply amounts to Condition 5 (recall that it is implied by Condition 4):
soptA U ≤ s′A (Condition 5)
Hence, if either Conditions 4, 2 and 1 are met, or Conditions 4, 2 and 3 are met and 1 is not
met, then a U1 equilibrium also exists.
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C1 equilibrium (soptA C,Ø, C)
• MNC
The MNC will choose concentration with subsidy soptA C if country B’s subsidy is below the
profit indifference level. This obviously depends on government B deciding to post a subsidy
consistent with this location choice.
• Government B
Since the sub-game between governments is simultaneous, a C1 equilibrium only obtains when-
ever government B is better off with concentration at government A’s equilibrium subsidy level,
i.e. soptA C is sufficient for government B to prefer concentration. Hence the necessity of Condition
1:
soptA C ≥ s′A (Condition 1)
• Government A
For C1 to be an equilibrium it is sufficient that Condition 2 does not hold, since then the
candidate equilibrium subsidy payoff-dominates all other subsidies conducive to either concentra-
tion (by construction) or ubiquity (by the Condition). However, this condition is not necessary.
Whenever Condition 2 holds, it is sufficient that Condition 5 fails to hold for a C1 equilibrium to
occur. Indeed, the invalidity of Condition 5 implies that against soptA U government B will always
choose sB so as to induce concentration. Given that concentration with soptA C is feasible, it must
be government A’s best reply.
C2 equilibrium20 (s′A,Ø, C)
A C2 equilibrium obtains when a subsidy higher than soptA C is necessary to make government B
accept concentration. Obviously, A would prefer it to be the smallest amount required by B not
to ’compete’, hence we may talk about a limit-subsidy equilibrium. Given our assumption that
ubiquity should be the status quo location in case of equal profits, it is sufficient for government
A to offer an infinitesimal quantity over the limit subsidy to secure location of the MNC. 21
For the MNC, as in the previous subsection, sB must be sufficiently low for the MNC to
choose concentration. Rather straightforwardly, for government B, Condition 1 must be invalid
for a C2 equilibrium to exist else the C1 subsidy would be available for and preferred by A.
Examining government A’s best-reply strategy, we find that the invalidity of Condition 3 rules out
any subsidy leading to ubiquity, as the candidate subsidy must payoff-dominate it. Alternatively,
when Condition 3 is met, the invalidity of Condition 6 guarantees that the limit-subsidy strategy
be payoff-dominant. Hence, a C2 (limit-subsidy) equilibrium exists whenever Conditions 1 and 3
are not met, or whenever Conditions 1 and 6 are not met but Condition 3 is met, excluding the
above-mentioned U1 equilibrium.
U2 equilibrium (soptA U, s˜B(s
opt
A U), U)
Loosely speaking, a U2 equilibrium obtains when government A reaches a high level of welfare with
ubiquity and government B is able to ’compete’ for high enough amounts of subsidies. This results
in government B offering the exact amount of subsidy that leads to the status quo (ubiquity, by
assumption).
Formally, a U2 equilibrium occurs whenever it is in both governments’ interest to offer subsidy
levels that exactly induce the MNC to keep the status quo, i.e. on the profit indifference line.
First consider the case where Condition 1 is met. Condition 5 being true implies a ranking of
the three reference subsidy levels. If Condition 4 is false, then the U1 equilibrium is not feasible,
but if Condition 2 holds, then by continuity government A’s best-reply curve should intersect with
20To save space, we will refer to Conditions 1− 6 as presented in Table 3.
21In the next section, we will consider that this infinitesimal amount tends to zero in our calculations.
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government B’s on the profit indifference line. This result derives from the shape of government
B’s best-reply function, as explained in the main text. Now consider the case when Condition 1 is
not met. As explained before, Condition 3 rules out one instance of the C2 equilibrium. Suppose
first that Condition 4 does not hold, implying that neither U1 nor C1 is feasible. Then by a
continuity argument again, government A’s best-reply must have a ’knife-edge’ shape, lying on the
profit indifference curve or away by an infinitesimal amount (inducing concentration). Condition
6 then ensures that a U2 equilibrium is reached.
Lastly, suppose that Condition 4 holds, namely that a U1 equilibrium would be feasible for
the firm but does not exist. Notice that Condition 4 implies Condition 5 (the reciprocal is not
true). If Condition 2 fails to hold, government A will not be satisfied with U1, hence playing again
along the profit indifference line, therefore Condition 6 will again determine which equilibrium will
occur.
To summarize, a U2 equilibrium occurs when Conditions 1, 2 and 5, but not 4, are met ; or,
when Conditions 1 and 2 are not met, but 4, 3 and 6 are met ; or when Conditions 1, 4 and 5
are not met, but 3 and 6 are met ; or else when Conditions 1 and 4 are not met, but 3 and 5 are
met. All these cases exhibit rivalry between the two governments, as government B is not willing
to settle for concentration, and government A has to offer more than it would without competition.
Appendix A2: MNC location under perfect integration
In this appendix, we establish the MNC location choice for the 3 types of regional integration.
From table 1, we know the MNC regional profits. The location decision of the MNC amounts
to choosing R such that Π = Max(ΠU ,ΠC)
Harmonization
Let’s begin by considering the case of harmonization (sA = sB = 0). What we need to show is that
regional integration involves a new location by the MNC, depending on regional characteristics. In
particular, we find that, in a technologically homogenous region, the MNC will keep operating two
subsidiaries (location U) but, when then region exhibits technological asymmetries, the MNC will
choose to relocate production so as to run a single subsidiary (location C). To see this, define, for
simplicity, a = A − αA and b = A − αB . So ΠU,R = 14 [a2 + (1 − φ)b2], ΠC,R = 14 [a2 + (a − t)2,
ΠU,ER = 1−φ4 [a
2+b2], and ΠC,ER = 1−φ4 [a
2, (a+t)2]. Let us call χ the profit differential (ΠU−ΠC).
Then χR = (1 − φ)b2 − (a − t)2 for the case of a regional MNC and χER = b2 − a2 for the case
of an extra-regional MNC. Observe that χ increases with t so that, for sufficiently high values
of t, χ is positive (U is preferred by the MNC). When t decreases, the chances for a MNC to
choose concentration increase. Consider now the extreme case of full integration. In such a case,
χR = (1− φ)b2 − a2 and χER = b2 − a2 which equals 0 when technologies in each country are the
same (αA = αB). Thus, the MNC is indifferent between both location and, by convention, ubiquity
remains the prevailing equilibrium. In the case of an asymmetric region, a > b and therefore χ is
negative which implies that the preferred location will be concentration.
Regional subsidies
Let’s proceed now with the limit case of governments coordinating on subsidy levels that maximize
regional welfare, replicating the decision of a fictitious regional social planner. Consistent with our
framework, the timing of the game is now the following:
• first, the fictitious regional planner sets sA and sB
• second, the MNC chooses a location
Notice that the social planner may always set sregB (C) so as to induce the MNC to choose
concentration with the desired sregA (C). Hence any candidate equilibrium subsidy pair should
be compared to the one leading to a welfare maximum under concentration. For a start, let us
determine ’regionally optimal subsidies’, i.e. subsidies that maximize the sum of both national
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welfare functions conditional on the MNC choosing a given location. For the case of a regional
MNC we obtain,
sregA (U,R) = A− αA
sregB (U,R) = A− αB
sregA (C,R) = A− αA +
t
2
whereas for an extra-regional MNC,
sregA (U,ER) =
2φ− 1
3− 2φ (A− αA)
sregB (U,ER) =
2φ− 1
3− 2φ (A− αB)
sregA (U,ER) =
2φ− 1
3− 2φ (A− αA) +
t
2
with obvious notations22. It is easy to check that such subsidies bring prices down to marginal
cost, totally removing the market power inefficiency. For {sregA (C), 0, C} to be the equilibrium
triplet, it must hold that it welfare-dominates {sregA (U), sregB (U), U}, let alone any other subsidy
pair under ubiquity. This is true in the extra-regional MNC case whenever
t˜ER <
2
√
2
√
(α2A − α2B) + A(αB − αA)
3− 2φ
and for a regional MNC
t˜R < 2
√
2
√
(α2A − α2B) + A(αB − αA)
It is easy to see that for a homogenous region t˜ equals 0 indicating that concentration is
not possible even under full integration. For a region made of different countries, for any t ≤ t˜
concentration will be the prevailing equilibrium. To check that Ubiquity is indeed an equilibrium
we need to verify that the MNC will choose Ubiquity when receiving sregA (U), s
reg
B (U). Put another
way, we need to show that ΠU (sregA (U), s
reg
B (U))−ΠC(sregA (U), t) for t > t˜ which is clear after simple
inspection. Summarizing, in the absence of trade within the region, the prevailing equilibrium is
U1. Under perfect integration, U1 prevails when the region is homogenous, C1 otherwise.
Subsidy competition
For establishing location in the case of subsidy competition in an integrated region, we need to
evaluate Conditions 1 − 6 for t = 0 for every type of region. Normalizing for commodity matter
φ = 0 when repatriation is high, φ = 1 when repatriation is low, and using Tables 2 and 1, and
Figure 4, straightforward calculations show that:
• For a symmetric region (αA = αB) in the case of a regional MNC, Conditions 4, 2, 3 and 1
are never satisfied, Condition 6 always hold. Condition 1 is satisfied for high values of φ and
therefore C1 is the prevailing equilibrium. For low values of φ Condition 1 is not satisfied
and therefore the equilibrium is C2.
• For an asymmetric region (αA = 0, αB > 0) in the case of a regional MNC, only Conditions 1
and 6 are satisfied repatriation is high and therefore the equilibrium is C1. When repatriation
is low, satisfying Condition 1 depends on regional asymmetry. If αB < A3 Condition 1 is not
satisfied and therefore the equilibrium is C2. The prevailing equilibrium is C1 otherwise.
22Note that regional subsidies for a regional MNC do not depend on φ, the part of profits that
is appropriated by country B.
26
• For a symmetric region (αA = αB) in the case of an extra-regional MNC, Conditions 1 and
2 are not satisfied whereas Conditions 3, 4, and 5 are satisfied. Therefore the equilibrium is
U1.
• For an asymmetric region (αA = 0, αB > 0) in the case of an extra-regional MNC, Condition
1 is satisfied for αB > A3 when repatriation is low and for αB >
A
2 when repatriation is high.
As Condition 2 is never satisfied independently of the repatriation, the prevailing equilibrium
in those cases is C1. Otherwise, Condition 1 does not hold. For all values of φ, Condition
3 holds and Condition 4 is never satisfied. When repatriation is high, Condition 5 holds.
When repatriation is low, Condition 5 is not satisfied while Condition 6 is satisfied. Both
situations correspond to U2 as the prevailing equilibrium.
Appendix A3: Harmonization as a welfare-improving policy
option
From our study of an extra-regional MNC we know that when technologically different countries
compete for location, the prevailing equilibrium under full integration is U2. In this case, country
A offers soptA (U) and country B offers s˜B(s
opt
A (U)). Conversely, the equilibrium associated with
harmonization is C1. Define ∆ = W reg(C, 0, t) −W reg(U, soptA (U), s˜B(soptA (U))) as the difference
in regional welfare with harmonization and subsidy competition. Using Table 4 and recalling that
αA = 0 and αB ≥ 0, we obtain
∆ =
A(4αB −A(1− 2φ)2)
12− 8φ
Observe that ∆ is positive for αB > 14A(1−2φ)2. This means that for sufficiently high levels of
regional asymmetry, harmonization dominates subsidy competition. How high φ must be, depends
on the level of repatriation. For intermediate levels of φ (i.e. φ = 12 ) this result holds even for
tiny differences between the countries. For extreme values of φ, harmonization dominates subsidy
competition for intermediate levels of regional asymmetry.
As for the regional MNC, we know by construction that subsidy competition dominates har-
monization when both regimes lead to the same type of equilibrium. Therefore to see whether
harmonization dominates subsidy competition in the case of a regionally owned MNC, we need
to look at the following situations and at their corresponding welfare comparison between subsidy
competition and harmonization:
1. Low repatriation and similar countries, W reg(U, 0, 0) with W reg(C, s′A, 0)
2. Low repatriation and different countries, W reg(C, 0, t) with W reg(C, s′A, 0)
3. High repatriation and similar countries, W reg(U, 0, 0) with W reg(C, soptA (C), 0);
Let ∆1 = ( 74 − 2)A2, ∆2 =
7A2+4α2B−8A(
√
(A−αB)2+αB)
4 and ∆3 =
27α2B−10A2−54AαB
72 be the
expressions of such comparisons and observe that they are negative for the pertinent parameters
values.
Appendix A4: Net gains from trade
We know so far that the reduction of regional tariffs may lead to an excess of subsidization.
In the case of an extra-regional MNC subsidy competition prevents the region from enjoying
gains from trade. The effect of integration consists is to switch from a U1 to a U2 equilibrium.
Simple investigation of regional welfare under both equilibria shows that reducing trade barriers
within the region reduces welfare (W reg(U, soptA (U), s
opt
B (U)) − W reg(U, soptA (U), s˜B(soptA (U))) =
α2B
6−4φ , which is always positive).
Once again, the effect of ownership reverses the results. When the MNC is regionally-owned,
regional integration implies relocation towards the more advanced country. Conditional on φ the
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equilibrium will be either C1 or C2. To confirm that regional integration is welfare enhancing, we
need to show that:
W reg(C, soptA (C), 0) ≥W reg(U, soptA (U), soptB (U)) for high repatriation (4)
W reg(C, s′A, 0) ≥W reg(U, soptA (U), soptB (U)) for low repatriation (5)
We are now left with proving that these conditions are always satisfied. To that purpose, we
have to compare W reg(U, soptA , s
opt
B ) with the regional welfare at the prevailing equilibrium under
perfect integration. As this depends on the level of repatriation and on regional asymmetry, the
correspondent comparisons are:
• ∆4 = W reg(U, soptA (U), soptB (U))-W reg(C, s′A, 0) for low repatriation and αB ≤ A3
• ∆5 = W reg(U, soptA (U), soptB (U))-W reg(C, soptA (C), 0) otherwise
Note that s′A is evaluated at a zero tariff. Simple calculation yields:
• ∆4 = 12 (4A2 − 4A
√
(A− αB)2 − 6AαB + 3α2B)
• ∆5a = 5α
2
B−10αBA−2A2
18 for a high repatriation rate and
• ∆5b = A29 −AαB + α
2
B
2 for the special case of low repatriation and αB >
A
3
which are always negative.
Appendix A5: Gains from trade and coordination
We prove here Proposition 5
First, a brief inspection of nationally and regionally optimal subsidies (Appendix A2) shows
that they coincide only at a U1 equilibrium. Second, as explained in Appendix A2, U1 subsidies
must induce the MNC to choose ubiquity for U1 to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium, implying
that an analog of Condition 4 with regional subsidies is met. This analog condition is given by
Π(sregA U, s
reg
B U,U) ≥ Π(sregA U, sregB U,C)
Define t1 as the threshold tariff such that the inequality in Condition 4 just holds, and similarly
t2 for the analog condition. Then t ≥ min{t1, t2} is a sufficient condition to obtain different
equilibria under subsidy competition and coordination. Note that it is straightforward to compute
these threshold tariffs using Table 3 and show that they exceed prohibitively high tariffs.
Since regional coordination achieves a regional welfare maximum by assumption, a gain from
coordination always occurs for a low enough tariff.
Appendix A6 : Gains from coordination and trade integration
We prove here Proposition 6.
1. Recall from Table 4 that at a full-integration subgame-perfect equilibrium, the extra-regional
MNC chooses ubiquity: either with U1 subsidies when countries are technologically symmet-
ric, or with U2 subsidies in the case of a technological asymmetry. On the contrary, a social
planner would prefer concentration with C1 subsidies (weakly in the symmetric case). The
welfare differential between coordination and competition is given by:
W reg(sregA C, t, C)−W reg(soptA U, soptB U,U) =
(A− αA)2
3− 2φ −
3− 2φ
16
t2− (A− αA)
2 + (A− αB)2
2(3− 2φ)
in the cases of symmetry and by
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W reg(sregA C, t, C)−W reg(soptA U, soptB U,U) =
(A− αA)2
3− 2φ −
3− 2φ
16
t2− (A− αA)
2 + (A− αB)2
2(3− 2φ)
in the case of asymmetry. Taking the derivatives of these welfare differentials with respect
to t yields:
∂
[
W reg(sregA C, t, C)−W reg(soptA U, soptB U,U)
]
∂t
= −3− 2φ
8
t2
in the symmetric case and
∂
[
W reg(sregA C, t, C)−W reg(soptA U, soptB U,U)
]
∂t
= −3− 2φ
8
t2 − αB − αA
2
in the asymmetric case. It is straightforward to see, that evaluated in the neighborhood of
a zero tariff, these derivatives are negative, proving the first part of this Proposition.
2. Similarly, we may evaluate the derivative of the gain from coordination with respect to t
in the neighborhood of zero. We know from 4 that either C1 or C2 may obtain as an
equilibrium.
In the former case, the gain from coordination is given by
∂
[
W reg(sregA C, t, C)−W reg(soptA C, t, C)
]
∂t
=
A− αA
6
+
t
4
which is positive at any relevant value of t, and in particular at t = 0.
In the latter case, the gain from coordination is given by a similar though substantially more
cumbersome calculation. We display here the value of this derivative at the neighborhood
of a zero tariff.
∂
[
W reg(sregA C, t, C)−W reg(soptA C, t, C)
]
∂t
=
3
(
(A− αA)
√
3− 2φ− (A− αB)
)
2
√
3− 2φ
which is also positive, and strictly so in the asymmetric case.
Hence potential tariff increases from full integration may cause higher gains from coordina-
tion, suggesting that the maximum gain occurs at a positive tariff level.
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